

CIA/OCI/BRIEF 137-75  
3 SEPTEMBER 1975

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00698R000300010039-7

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE BRIEF 337-75.4

1. PERU: CABINET CHANGES ANNOUNCED SEPTEMBER 1 BY PERU'S PRESIDENT MORALES BERMUDEZ SUGGEST AN EFFORT TO CONSOLIDATE HIS POSITION, A COMMITMENT TO CONTINUE MANY OF FORMER PRESIDENT VELASCO'S DOMESTIC POLICIES, A DESIRE TO MAINTAIN A MORE STABLE AND BUSINESS-LIKE POSTURE; AND A SENSITIVITY TO CONTINUED LACK OF CIVILIAN SUPPORT AFTER SEVEN YEARS OF MILITARY RULE.4

FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE MILITARY TOOK POWER IN OCTOBER 1968, A CIVILIAN HAS BEEN NAMED TO A CABINET POST. THE APPOINTMENT OF ECONOMIST LUIS BARUA AS MINISTER OF ECONOMY AND FINANCE IS CERTAIN TO RAISE HOPES THAT OTHER LIBERALIZATION MEASURES ARE IN THE OFFING. ADDITIONAL CABINET CHANGES ARE LIKELY.4

SOME OF FORMER PRESIDENT VELASCO'S MINISTERS REMAIN IN HIGH GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY POSITIONS--AN INDICATION THAT SOME OF PERU'S MORE RADICAL OFFICERS WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE A VOICE IN SETTING POLICIES. WE EXPECT, HOWEVER, THAT THE INFLUENCE OF THESE OFFICERS WILL BE SOMEWHAT DIMINISHED. ONE OF VELASCO'S MOST VOCAL AND ANTI-US ASSOCIATES, GENERAL FERNANDEZ MALDONADO, HAS BEEN REMOVED AS

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MINISTER OF ENERGY AND MINES AND NAMED TO THE LESS INFLUENTIAL POSITION OF ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF.<sup>4</sup>

IN MAKING THIS SHIFT, MORALES BERMUDEZ WAS BOTH RESPECTING MILITARY SENIORITY AND TRYING TO MOVE AWAY FROM THE EXTREMISM OF VELASCO'S POLICIES. THE PRESIDENT HAS REPLACED FERNANDEZ Maldonado AT THE MINISTRY WITH GENERAL LA VERA VALARDE, WHO DECLARED HIMSELF AGAINST VELASCO EARLY IN THE COUP PROCESS.

A NUMBER OF OTHER BACKERS OF THE NEW PRESIDENT HAVE BEEN PLACED IN IMPORTANT GOVERNMENTSPOTS. REPORTS FROM LIMA SUGGEST THAT SOME OFFICERS KNOWN TO HAVE A TASTE FOR POLITICAL INTRIGUES HAVE BEEN RETIRED OR RELIEVED OF THEIR JOBS. THESE INCLUDE BOTH RADICAL OFFICERS AND THOSE FAVORING LESS REPRESSIVE POLICIES.<sup>4</sup>

THE FATE OF THE RADICAL GENERAL GRAHAM HURTADO, UNTIL RECENTLY A STRONG ALLY OF VELASCO, REMAINS UNCERTAIN. IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT HE WILL RETAIN HIS POSITION AS HEAD OF THE PRESTIGIOUS PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE.<sup>4</sup>

ANOTHER GENERAL WHO HAD BEEN A STRONG VELASCO SUPPORTER, GENERAL RODRIGUEZ FIGUEROA, HAS SUFFERED A DEMOTION. FORMERLY LIMA'S

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MILITARY REGION COMMANDER. HE HAS BEEN NAMED HEAD OF THE GOVERNMENT INFORMATION OFFICE. {CONFIDENTIAL}4

2. ECUADOR: ECUADOR'S PRESIDENT RODRIGUEZ HAS MANAGED TO RESTORE CALM TO QUITO FOLLOWING THE COUP ATTEMPT ON SEPTEMBER 1, BUT HE MAY FIND DEALING WITH THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF DISCONTENT A MORE DIFFICULT MATTER.4

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, WHICH HAVE STIRRED WIDE CRITICISM OF RODRIGUEZ' POLICIES AND WERE A MAJOR CAUSE OF THE MOVE AGAINST HIM, REMAIN. HOW HE CHOOSES TO COPE WITH DEMANDS FOR CHANGE WILL DETERMINE WHETHER UNREST WILL CONTINUE.4

THE ATTEMPTED COUP COULD SET BACK, AT LEAST TEMPORARILY, RECENT MOVES BY THE RODRIGUEZ GOVERNMENT TO SHIFT ITS POLICY ORIENTATION AWAY FROM THE LEFT AND TOWARD THE CENTER. CONSERVATIVE OPPONENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT ARE LIKELY TO FEEL A TASTE OF WHATEVER RETRIBUTION IS METED OUT BY RODRIGUEZ AS A WARNING TO FUTURE PLOTTERS.4

THE PRESIDENT MAY USE HIS EASY VICTORY OVER THE REBELS TO STRENGTHEN HIS CONTROL OVER THE COUNTRY. HE HAS ALREADY ACCUSED "IRRESPONSIBLE POLITICIANS" OF INSTIGATING THE REBELLION, POSSIBLY

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SIGNALING A CRACKDOWN ON CONSERVATIVE POLITICAL AND BUSINESS GROUPS THAT MAY HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE MILITARY OFFICERS INVOLVED IN THE COUP TRY.4

RODRIGUEZ WILL PROBABLY USE THE OPPORTUNITY TO STIFLE CRITICISM OF HIS GOVERNMENT BY THE MEDIA.4

LEADING CIVILIAN CRITICS OF THE REGIME, ANTICIPATING GOVERNMENT REPRESSION, ALREADY HAVE GONE INTO HIDING. PRESS REPORTS INDICATE THAT GOVERNMENT FORCES HAVE RAIDED THE HOMES OF SOME POLITICAL AND BUSINESS LEADERS, AND A DUSK-TO-DAWN CURFEW IS IN EFFECT IN QUITO AND GUAYAQUIL.4

SO FAR, 80 SOLDIERS AND OFFICERS HAVE BEEN PLACED UNDER ARREST.  
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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITY
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- RETURN TO PER
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. EUROPEAN BRIEF 137-75.4

1. PORTUGAL: PORTUGUESE OFFICERS OPPOSED TO PRO-COMMUNIST FORMER PRIME MINISTER VASCO GONCALVES ARE STEPPING UP EFFORTS TO REMOVE HIM AS ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF WITHOUT RESTORING TO VIOLENCE. THEIR EFFORTS, PLUS PARALLEL MOVES BY THE POLITICAL PARTIES, HAVE LED TO A POSTPONEMENT OF THE SWEARING IN OF A NEW GOVERNMENT UNDER PRIME MINISTER AZEVEDO.4

ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF FABIAO AND HIS AIR FORCE COUNTERPART, GENERAL MORAIS DA SILVA, HAVE PUBLICLY DENOUNCED GONCALVES. EACH HAS CALLED ON THE SEPARATE ASSEMBLY OF HIS SERVICE TO PURGE GONCALVES' SUPPORTERS BEFORE A SCHEDULED MEETING ON FRIDAY OF THE ARMED FORCES GENERAL ASSEMBLY.4

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, WHICH IS MADE UP OF 240 OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN AND HAS GENERALLY FOLLOWED A PRO-GONCALVES LINE, HAS BEEN CALLED INTO SESSION BY PRESIDENT COSTA GOMES TO REVAMP THE ONCE-POWERFUL REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. THE ARMY HOLDS 120 SEATS IN THE ASSEMBLY AND THE AIR FORCE 60. THE REMAINING SEATS ARE CONTROLLED BY THE NAVY, WHICH EARLIER ENDORSED GONCALVES' BID TO

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PAGE 3 OF PAGES

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REMAIN PRIME MINISTER.<sup>4</sup>

IT HAS BEEN WIDELY ASSUMED THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WILL BE USED TO PURGE THE LEADERS OF THE ANTI-GONCALVES FACTION. IF THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE SUCCEED IN PACKING THEIR DELEGATIONS, HOWEVER, THEY COULD TURN THE ASSEMBLY INTO AN EFFECTIVE WEAPON AGAINST GONCALVES.<sup>4</sup>

GONCALVES AND HIS COMMUNIST SUPPORTERS ARE CLEARLY WORRIED ABOUT THE TWO-PRONGED STRATEGY OF THE ANTI-COMMUNIST ANTUNES GROUP. THIS STRATEGY IS DESIGNED TO SHOW THAT GONCALVES CANNOT CONTROL THE ARMED FORCES AND TO USE THE ASSEMBLY AGAINST HIM.<sup>4</sup>

AIR FORCE CHIEF MORAIS DA SILVA WAS SUMMONED TO THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE TO EXPLAIN HIS REFUSAL TO SUPPORT GONCALVES IN HIS NEW POST. HIS REFUSAL WAS ALSO CRITICIZED BY THE GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED AND COMMUNIST-INFLUENCED NATIONAL RADIO IN WHAT MAY BE THE OPENING VOLLEY OF A COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE.<sup>4</sup>

MORAIS DA SILVA WAS JOINED IN HIS CENSURE OF GONCALVES ON TUESDAY BY FABIAO, WHO CALLED GONCALVES A DIVISIVE INFLUENCE ON THE ARMY. FABIAO, WHO HAS REMAINED SILENT ON THE QUESTION OF

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INDEX

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NO INDEX

RETURN TO

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• GONCALVES SINCE HE BACKED DOWN LAST WEEK FROM HIS EFFORT TO REPLACE THE LATTER AS PRIME MINISTER, APPEARS TO HAVE RE-ENTERED THE FRAY—SOMEWHAT MORE DETERMINED THIS TIME.<sup>4</sup>

THE DEMOCRATIC PARTIES HAVE FORCED THE FORMATION OF THE NEW CABINET TO TAKE A BACK SEAT TO THE GONCALVES ISSUE. IN SPITE OF A HINT BY NEUPLY APPOINTED PRIME MINISTER AZEVEDO ON TELEVISION MONDAY THAT HE IS PLANNING A GOVERNMENT THAT WOULD RESURRECT THE FORMER MULTI-PARTY COALITION, THE SOCIALISTS AND POPULAR DEMOCRATS ARE STILL REFUSING TO COOPERATE AS LONG AS GONCALVES REMAINS. **{SECRET}**<sup>4</sup>

2. USSR-VIETNAM: LAST WEEK MOSCOW SENT A DELEGATION TO HANOI FOR THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF NORTH VIETNAMESE INDEPENDENCE AND THE OPENING OF HO CHI MINH'S MAUSOLEUM. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE DELEGATION THUS FAR IS ITS MEETING, ANNOUNCED ON TUESDAY, WITH CAMBODIAN LEADER KHIEM SAMPHAN, WHO IS ALSO IN HANOI FOR THE ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS. THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN TRYING TO IMPROVE THEIR RELATIONS WITH SITHANOUK AND CAMBODIAN COMMUNIST LEADERS EVER SINCE THE SPRING, BUT UNTIL NOW THERE HAS BEEN NO GOOD

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INDICATION THAT THEIR EFFORTS WERE BEARING FRUIT.

TASS REPORTED THAT THE TALKS COVERED PROBLEMS OF MUTUAL INTEREST AND THAT THEY WERE HELD IN A "FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE."<sup>4</sup>

THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO HANOI IS HEADED BY ALTERNATE POLITBURO MEMBER SOLOMENTSEV.//MOSCOW'S DECISION TO SEND THE RELATIVELY LOW-RANKING SOLOMENTSEV TO HANOI MAY REFLECT A DESIRE TO AVOID OFFENDING US SENSITIVITIES PRIOR TO THE SOVIET-US SUMMIT.//CHINA DID NOT SEND A DELEGATION TO THE CEREMONIES SURROUNDING THE OPENING OF THE SOVIET-BUILT MAUSOLEUM, BUT ITS DELEGATION TO THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY FESTIVITIES WAS LED BY VICE PREMIER AND FULL POLITBURO MEMBER CHEN HSI-LIEN.<sup>4</sup>

SOLOMENTSEV'S DELEGATION INCLUDES PARTY SECRETARY KATUSHEV, WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR RELATIONS WITH RULING COMMUNIST PARTIES AND WHO LAID THE GROUNDWORK FOR PRESIDENT PODGORNY'S VISIT TO NORTH VIETNAM IN

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1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32
33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48
49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56
57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64

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JUNE 1972. HIS INCLUSION IN THE DELEGATION MAY MEAN THAT BREZHNEV, KOSYGIN, OR PODGORNY IS PLANNING A TRIP TO HANOI SOMETIME IN 1976. IN MOSCOW'S VIEW, SUCH A TRIP PROBABLY WOULD SERVE TO STRENGTHEN THE USSR'S CURRENT EDGE IN HANOI VIS A VIS THE CHINESE.<sup>4</sup>

THE WEEK BEFORE SOLOMENTSEV WENT TO HANOI, NORTH VIETNAM'S CHIEF AID NEGOTIATOR WAS IN MOSCOW, WHERE HE HAD APPARENTLY CORDIAL CONVERSATIONS WITH PREMIER KOSYGIN AND SOVIET AID OFFICIALS. NGHI'S VISIT WAS BILLED AS COVERING HANOI'S AID NEEDS OVER THE COURSE OF ITS NEXT FIVE-YEAR PLAN. IT MAY WELL BE THAT WHEN AN AGREEMENT IS FINALLY ANNOUNCED, IT WILL COVER MORE THAN HANOI'S AID REQUIREMENTS FOR 1976. SOVIET PROPAGANDA HANDLING OF THE VISIT, UNLIKE PEKING'S, WAS WARM AND VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL TO ITS HANDLING OF NGHI'S VISIT THIS TIME LAST YEAR. LAST YEAR NO AID AGREEMENTS WERE SIGNED UNTIL DECEMBER, AND NGHI RETURNED TO MOSCOW FOR THE SIGNING. [CONFIDENTIAL]<sup>4</sup>

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Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010039-7

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3. USSR: MOSCOW'S UNOFFICIAL ARTISTS, INTENT ON MARKING THE ANNIVERSARY ON SEPTEMBER 15 OF LAST YEAR'S "ART MASSACRE," MAY AGAIN GENERATE A CONFLICT THAT COULD GIVE THE REGIME MASSIVE, UNFAVORABLE PUBLICITY IN THE WEST. IN SUCH AN EVENT, SOVIET OFFICIALS MAY FIND IT EMBARRASSING TO ASSERT THAT THEIR DOMESTIC ACTIONS ARE NOT CIRCUMSCRIBED BY THE HELSINKI ACCORDS.4

THE ARTISTS, WHO HAD BEEN PLANNING FOR AN EXHIBIT SINCE EARLY THIS SPRING, HAD LAIN LOW DURING THE SUMMER BECAUSE OF OFFICIAL HARASSMENT. LAST WEEK THEY RECEIVED A "FLAT REFUSAL" OF EXHIBIT SPACE FROM THE CULTURE MINISTRY. THE REASONS GIVEN WERE SHORTAGE OF SUITABLE HALLS AND THE PROSPECT THAT EXHIBITORS WOULD INCLUDE ARTISTS FROM CITIES OTHER THAN MOSCOW.4

DURING EARLIER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ARTISTS, MINISTRY OFFICIALS SEEMED EAGER TO AVOID AN OPEN

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AIR SHOW, BEARING IN MIND THE TARRING OF THE SOVIET IMAGE BY THE WORLD PRESS LAST YEAR AND THE UNWELCOME, FAVORABLE PUBLICITY FOR SOVIET DISSIDENT ART RESULTING FROM AN OFFICIALLY SANCTIONED OPEN-AIR SHOW TWO WEEKS LATER.<sup>4</sup>

BOTH THE RÉGIME AND THE ARTISTS NOW FACE A DILEMMA. THE ARTISTS MUST DECIDE WHETHER TO STAGE AN UNAUTHORIZED SHOW AND SUFFER THE CONSEQUENCES, OR PULL BACK--AN OPTION THAT THE RÉGIME'S TOUGH POSTURE IS DESIGNED TO HELP THEM CHOOSE. AT THE MOMENT THE ARTISTS APPEAR UNDECIDED, BUT MOST BELIEVE THAT FOREIGN PUBLICITY IS THEIR ONLY HOPE--A VIEW THAT ARGUES IN FAVOR OF SOME GESTURE REGARDLESS OF THE CONSEQUENCES. THE RÉGIME, ON THE OTHER HAND, EVIDENTLY IS SEEKING A SOLUTION THAT PROMISES TO MINIMIZE PUBLICITY, AND FOR NOW SEEMS TO BELIEVE THAT FORESTALLING A SHOW WILL ACHIEVE THIS AIM BETTER THAN PERMITTING IT.<sup>4</sup>

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PAGE 1 PAGE 1

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INDEX

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NO INDEX

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PER

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THE SITUATION FACING THE ARTISTS MIRRORS IN MANY WAYS THAT OF THE DISSIDENTS, JEWS, AND OTHERS REGARDED BY THE REGIME AS THE DANGEROUS OR EMBARRASING FLOTSAM OF SOVIET SOCIETY. SOME HAVE SPENT A QUIET, OTHERS AN ACTIVE, SUMMER. MANY INITIALLY LOOKED AT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE HELSINKI SUMMIT OPTIMISTICALLY, EVEN WHILE SOVIET PROPAGANDISTS DID THEIR UTMOST TO DISABUSE THEM OF THEIR HOPES.<sup>4</sup>

MEANWHILE, THE REGIME'S CONTINUING INERTIA IN BASIC CULTURAL POLICY HAD PRODUCED A FAMILIAR, CHECKERED PATTERN OF RELUCTANT CONCESSIONS TO THOSE FEW WHOSE CAUSE IS TAKEN UP BY THE WEST, WHILE THE MANY WITHOUT A VOICE ARE SUBJECTED TO AN INTENSIFIED CAMPAIGN AGAINST UNORTHODOXY.<sup>4</sup>

AS THE NEW DETERMINATION OF MOSCOW'S UNCONVENTIONAL ARTISTS SUGGESTS, THE FALL MAY SEE SOME RESUMPTION OF DISSIDENT ACTIVITIES AND, ULTIMATELY, A TESTING OF THE REGIME'S COMMITMENT TO HELSINKI'S

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Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010039-7 IMPDET

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 INDEX #

HUMAN RIGHTS AND CULTURAL CONTACTS PROVISIONS. SUCH TESTS HOLD THE POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE SKEPTICS AMONG SOVIET DISSIDENTS FEEL THIS COMMITMENT TO BE SHALLOW OR NON-EXISTENT, AND THE HELSINKI PROVISIONS TO BE ENFORCEABLE--IF AT ALL--ONLY BY TURNING THE SPOTLIGHT OF WESTERN PUBLICITY AND OFFICIAL PRESSURE ON THE SOVIET DOMESTIC SCENE. (CONFIDENTIAL)4

4. YUGOSLAVIA: THE HEADS OF YUGOSLAV SECURITY AGENCIES HAVE RECEIVED NEW ORDERS DIRECT FROM TITO, AND A MAJOR "VIGILANCE" CAMPAIGN MAY BE IN THE OFFING.4

ACCORDING TO A BRIEF TANJUG ANNOUNCEMENT, MAJOR GENERAL FRANJO HERLJEVIC, MINISTER OF INTERIOR, HIS COUNTERPARTS FROM ALL THE REPUBLICS AND PROVINCES, AND THE HEAD OF THE MILITARY SECURITY SERVICE HEARD TITO PRAISE THEIR PAST ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND ASSIGN UNSPECIFIED PRIORITY TASKS AT A MEETING ON SUNDAY.4

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MEETING IS ACCENTUATED

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BY TITO'S DECISION TO HOLD IT ON HIS FIRST DAY IN BELGRADE AFTER SEVERAL MONTHS OF VACATION. MOREOVER, STANE DOLANC, NUMBER TWO IN THE PARTY, VLADIMIR BAKARIC, TITO'S DEPUTY IN THE COLLECTIVE STATE EXECUTIVE, AND PREMIER DZEMAL BIJEDIC WERE IN ATTENDANCE.<sup>4</sup>

THERE IS ANY NUMBER OF TOPICS TITO MIGHT WANT TREATED WITH MORE VIGOR BY THE SECURITY NETWORK. FOR EXAMPLE, THE PROCESS OF ROOTING OUT "COMINFORMISTS" AND OTHER PRO-SOVIETS APPEARS TO BE BUILDING MOMENTUM. AS A RESULT OF THE RECENT COUPS IN PERU AND BANGLADESH, TITO MAY ALSO BE HAVING ANOTHER OF HIS PERIODIC SPASMS OF ANXIETY ABOUT A MASSIVE PLOT TO "GET" NONALIGNED LEADERS.<sup>4</sup>

WHATEVER THE NEW "TASKS" MAY BE, IT IS ALMOST CERTAIN THAT THE INTERNAL SECURITY OFFICIALS ALSO HEARD SOME ADMONITIONS ON THEIR PROPER--I.E. SUBSERVIENT--RELATIONSHIP TO THE PARTY. IN MID-JULY, VICE PRESIDENT BAKARIC WARNED A PARTY PLENUM THAT

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PAGE OF PAGES

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THE INTERNAL SECURITY ORGANS MIGHT BE GROWING TOO STRONG AND INDEPENDENT. HE CALLED FOR A REVIEW OF PARTY CONTROLS OVER THE "WATCHERS" AND ESPECIALLY OVER THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND INTERNAL SECURITY FUNCTIONARIES IN THE LOCAL COMMUNITIES. [CONFIDENTIAL] E-2 IMPDET.H

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Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010039-7 IMPDET  
CL BY: OIO 725

**OUTGOING MESSAGE**

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86A00608R000300010039-7

1		7
0		8
0		9

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE COI ACP TOG TPK MRO DCI

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

CLASSIFICATION

**UNCLASSIFIED**

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE/TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF:

INFO: FILE

- |                          |           |            |
|--------------------------|-----------|------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> | INDEX     | DISSEM BY: |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | NO INDEX  |            |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | RETURN TO | PER        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | IP FILES  | #          |

EAST ASIA BRIEF 137-75.4

NOTHING TO REPORT {UNCLASSIFIED} E-2 IMPDET.H

SD0

DDODO

25X1A

25X1A

DATE: SEPTEMBER 3, 1975

ORIG: [REDACTED]

UNIT: OCI/FLO

EXT: 9498

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86A00608R000300010039-7 2 IMPDET  
CL BY: 010725

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010039-7  
OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTING	1	4	7
	2	5	8
	3	6	9

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AUE CCI ACP TOG TPE MPO DDI

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES

2 2

CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

- INDEX DISSEM BY:  
 NO INDEX  
 RETURN TO PER  
 IN FILES

MIDDLE EAST AFRICA BRIEF 137-75.4

NOTHING TO REPORT {UNCLASSIFIED} E-2 IMPDET.H

SDO

DDODO

25X1A

25X1A

DATE: SEPTEMBER 3, 1975  
ORIG: [REDACTED]  
UNIT: OCL/FL0  
EXT: 9498

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010039-7

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET